Fernando Gonzalez and His Forehand

A couple of years ago, Fernando Gonzalez was known to be a loose cannon, a risk-taker and a big shotmaker. When you possess as much power and weaponry as Gonzalez does, it can be incredibly tempting to rely overly on it. But there's a time and place for big shots and if you wait around long enough for the right shot, you can actually increase the number of times of hitting that spectacular winner. By taking a mindset like that, he essentially took the possibility of using variety in his game, and all the shots in between.

Fortunately times have changed and now he's not afraid to use a wider range of shots, recognising that it's about doing what's required for the situation, nothing more, nothing less. Today's match against Tommy Haas in Washington showcased Gonzalez at his controlled best, aside from a couple of wobbles towards the end of the second set. When he blasts his forehand, it can be difficult to remember that there is actually a lot more to the shot than the sheer pace that he can create. It's actually an amazing shot all-round.

I spent the majority of the first set watching how he somehow makes the low percentage look high percentage by consistently hitting close to the lines over and over again on the forehand side. But that's not the impressive part. It was how he consistently hit his forehand close to the lines, breaking away further outside of the court after its bounce making the court look far bigger than it is. It's like he somehow curls outside the ball, so it's not like it creates a high bounce, but it moves away from the court. I think out of the other players, only Roger Federer can do the same although Nadal can create the same effect with additional topspin.

Gonzalez doesn't need a whole lot to work with to start dominating a rally with his forehand. That's why he's so difficult to break on his service games if he keeps it together concentration-wise. Gonzalez does have a great serve especially in terms of accuracy and the additional slice he adds to it to open up the court, but how he backs it up makes it look like an even better shot than it is. It's not really good enough to simply block back a return or hit a decent return that lands in three-quarter court.

He didn't receive anywhere near as many cheap points as Haas on first serve on the outright first stroke, but it had essentially the same effect, with Gonzalez usually winning it on his second or third shot. He didn't go for the outright flat scorching winner that much, this time favouring accuracy and spin over power with the intent of making Haas cover as much ground as possible. If Haas was to have any success on the Gonzalez serve, he needed to do something drastic. He needed to break the pattern, and with urgency.

Haas has the ability to do that, to chip and charge on the return of serve with which he tried at times but more so to mix up the play, rather than employing it as a consistent tactic. Unfortunately sometimes Haas lacks the depth on his returns, possibly because he stands so far behind the baseline to return. His strength is more in the consistency of his returns, and to hope that he can slowly turn around the point in his favour. That's why when he did come in to chip and charge, Gonzalez usually found an answer for it hitting passing shot winners seemingly at will.

Gonzalez can hit some beautiful dipping forehand passing shots, that by the time it reaches the other side of the net, it's well and truly past the area where Haas is standing to cover the net. Haas needs to target Gonzalez's backhand if he wants to approach the net, and he did it with more success on his own service games coming in on his own terms. It's a different situation on Gonzalez's backhand, where he really has a problem maintaining enough control to find a target if he's rushed trying to half-volley a shot.

It was a good tactical match from both sides, and in the end it came down more to execution and concentration, though Gonzalez's greater shotmaking ability also played a part in it. It was a combination of both because he needed Haas to play a couple of loose points on serve, and whenever the opportunity presented itself, Gonzalez was quick to take advantage of it and find his best shots, such as the backhand down-the-line winner at set point in the first set.

One poor service game from Haas, and the match had turned completely in Gonzalez's favour. What initially seemed like a small blip from Haas turned into a giant hole that he dug for himself, still recovering from the disappointment of the first set. Sometimes Haas reads too much into his own play, punishing himself unnecessarily for simply playing a couple of poor points. Forgetting that he had played a good match for the most part. He dropped his next service game with three or so cheap errors. Mentally he had checked out of the match.

It seemed like smooth sailing for Gonzalez, until Gonzalez's own moment of dropping his focus nearly cost him. Haas had one chance on a baseline rally that could have gone either way. He shanked a forehand wide by several metres. Then to make things worse, he played yet another service game reminiscent of the first game of the second set. Clearly Haas doesn't have much of a selective memory. Gonzalez dropped his next service game, but he was always in control given that he had a two break cushion and served it out the second time around to move into the semi-finals.